(DOWNLOAD) "State V. Schiappa" by Connecticut Supreme Court ~ eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: State V. Schiappa
- Author : Connecticut Supreme Court
- Release Date : January 23, 1999
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 87 KB
Description
After a jury trial, the defendant, Kim P. Schiappa, was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3) *fn2 and hindering prosecution in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-166. *fn3 The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict, *fn4 and the defendant appealed her manslaughter conviction to the Appellate Court, *fn5 claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly: (1) admitted a hearsay statement of Stephen Staffy after improperly concluding that Staffy was unavailable due to his purported lack of memory regarding the subject matter of the statement; and (2) allowed the jury to make a preliminary factual finding in connection with the determination of the admissibility of an adoptive admission by silence. The Appellate Court agreed with both of these claims and, accordingly, reversed the trial court's judgment as to the defendant's manslaughter conviction and remanded the case for a new trial on that count. State v. Schiappa, 44 Conn. App. 731, 692 A.2d 820 (1997). We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal limited to the two issues upon which the Appellate Court relied in reversing the defendant's manslaughter conviction. *fn6 State v. Schiappa, 241 Conn. 908, 695 A.2d 541 (1997). Thereafter, pursuant to what is now Practice Book § 84-11, *fn7 the defendant presented for review the following alternate grounds for affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court: (1) even if we conclude that the record supports the trial court's finding that Staffy was unavailable, the trial court nevertheless improperly admitted Staffy's out-of-court statement under our hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, which corresponds to Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (3); *fn8 (2) the admission of Staffy's statement violated the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United States constitution; *fn9 (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt; (4) the trial court failed to include certain language in its supplemental jury charge on first degree manslaughter, thereby depriving the defendant of her due process right to an adequately instructed jury; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the defendant's manslaughter conviction. Because we resolve the certified issues in favor of the state and reject the defendant's alternate grounds for affirmance, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.